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Since the collapse of the Soviet Umon, the United States has made several attempts to re-fashion its armed forces for the post-Cold War world The most recent effort, called the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), was a study that started filth high hopes Last year. then-Deputy Secretary of Defense John White called the QDR an opportumty to analyze "what we do, why we do rt, how we do it, and how we pay for it "I Another official boasted that the survey would "'put everything on the table,' mcludmg Arm). Kavy , and An Force budget shares and de-emphasize the goal of fighting two nearly simultaneous reglonal wars It2 In the end. the QDR fell short of those marks A forecast that the revue\\ would simply be a "reconfiguration of everything that already exists" proved a more accurate assessment than the lofty rhetonc of defense officials 3
Why did the QDR fall to meet its goals3 There was probably httle hope that the study would ever match the radical expectations espoused by some Those statements reflect an assumption that the study would be carried out m a "rational" process, unsulhed bj orgamzatlonal pohtlcs and pressures While there were many agencies and personalmes that affected the QDR m some M a>. It was the actlons of the .4rmq, Ya\>, and Air Force that played the major roles m shaping the final report Understandmg the outcome of the QDR must begin by exammmg how the services practiced bureaucratic specifics for the analysis, leaving Pentagon officials free to develop their own assumptions for the study From the begmnmg. defense executives made It clear that the QDR would not be an exhaustive review of the national security strategy of engagement and enlargement Instead, it was more narrowly focused on studying how the Department of Defense could meet those national secuIlty requirements given a fixed budget of $250 bllhon Although this restrlcted scope was less than some obseners had hoped for. it nas not an mconslderable task E\en a hmlted relleu could haxe resulted m slgmficant changes to the composltlon of the armed serclces. the reliance of the Lmted States on alhed partners. or the use of the reserves 5 A final assumption of the QDR was that the Department of Defense needed to Increase the amount of money spent on researchmg and dekelopmg new \+eapons and equipment to about S60 bllhon a year In recent years these so-called modemlzatlon accounts had been robbed to pal for ongoing operations, a necessary short-term expedient but a pattern that rlsked the long-term readiness and vlablllt> of the American mlhta~ Officials mmally hoped to pay for modemlzatlon b> shrmkmg the defense ' "Llberman Hopes to Strengthen Democrats and Defense Ties," Defense Week Februao 10 1997 12 ' WIlllam S Cohen, Reoort of the Ouadrenmal Defense Rewew (Washington, D C Government Prmtmg Office 1997), 2-12, Capacclo, "Everythmg," 4, ldem "Inslde the Quadrennial Defense Revre\j , 'I Defense Week December 16, 1996, S -7 mfiastructure, but It soon became apparent that some reduction of the semlces would also reconslderatlon of the plan to counter two major reglonal contingencies, renamed-major theater Rars Some programs for neb weapons were cut back. but none was canceled outright In addmon, the report recommended cutting 60,000 active duty troops. 55,000 reservists, and 80,000 c~vlhans lo Although the pohcy declslons m the QDR can be "pullmg and haulmg" can best be analyzed by using Carl Builder's framework of saDice personalmes described m The Masks of War While not without its faults, Builder's stud) provides the best mslght mto how the services react m bureaucratic pohtlcs I3
The Arm)
Builder argues that the Army concerns itself first and foremost with its readiness to fight, but when forced to talk about the size of the force, the service focuses on people rather than equipment The arguments put forth during the QDR ran closely to form, early stories about the review emphasized the Army's vulnerablhty and concern about losing up to hvo dlvlslons " Whether these stories were planted as part of a clever ~101 to gam support for the Army, or represented genuine concerns, or both. the) highlight the Arrnq's focus on people versus technolog> The Army unveiled a "framework for the future" m Sovember. 1996 to help bolster their arguments m the public domain An Arm) of&la1 famlhar LX lth Xrmv Vlslon 2010 admitted that it was part of an effort to prevent the Arm! from losmg an> mlsslons, and the accompanymg budget authority, to another service Army leaders reportedly felt especially vulnerable to claims that they should give up theater air defense and space management to the Air Force Armv Vision 20 10 also expressed sezl ice concerns about sacrlficmg active duty forces to technological solutions, such as the claims voiced b> both the Katy and the Au-Force about the efficacy of long-range precision strikes While admitting that these strikes had the pokter to "den? or destroy ." its resources, and people" \+as necessary to achlel e pohtlcal and military objectlkes I5
Obviously, ths was a role that only the Army could fulfill In addmon. large land forces were important because they provided the "most flexible and versatile capabktles for meeting commander-m-chief force requirements "16 Finally. the Army vision for the future posited that it was relatively easy to build weapons --it was much harder to build ZllLhll~"
As the QDR mot ed forward m the spring of 1997, and it became apparent that the sa\ mgs necessary to achle\ e the S60 bllhon goal for modemlzatlon could not be met bq reducing the infrastructure alone, the Army began to openly cntlclze the budgetan focus of the debate In early April, an e-mall message from Lieutenant General Jay Garner, the During the QDR debate there was a notable lack of coverage about the pl;a\?'s posltlon, a sure sign that thmgs were going well from their perspective --a suspicion confirmed b) the outcome In the end, the sea serwces emerged from the QDR debate m relatwely good shape The Navy did lose about 18,000 active duty sailors. and it was forced to slash the F/A-18 E/F buy from 1,000 down to a mmlmum of 548 This was a somev+hat deceptive loss, however. smce the mltlal number was predicated on a very high attrition rate and \xas already bemg scaled back In the all-important categoq of capital ships they held stead? They suffered no reductions m the number of carrier groups or the accompaqmg an wings The total number of surface combatants fell, but onI> shghtl). May 12. 1997,35 alter the necesslt> of fightmg and \+mmng two major theater WU-s "nearly slmultaneousl~ ,I' although it did recognize the need to address other operations " Personalmes were also a factor m how the armed senlces approached the QDR LIeutenant General Jay Garner, head of the Army's effort, had been part of the Commlsslon on Roles and MIssions HE counterpart m the An Force, Major General Charles Lmk. was a veteran of the same struggle Wl-ule there was a lack of public feuding during the QDR, the personal enmity built up durmg earlier enterpnses bred distrust and hostlhty among the partlclpants 36 While these other factors might not function as po\X erfull~ as the "service personalities." they imparted then-o\+n Impetus mto the debate and also helped shape the QDR outcome
Conclusion
Despite early expectations for a successful reappraisal of the Defense Department, the QDR report has been crmclzed on a number of grounds, but the most telling crltlque may be the lack of any lmkage between strategy. force structure, operatlonal concepts. and modemlzatlon plans 37 In short, the QDR resembles less the product of a "smgle ratlonal choice" and more the "pullmg and haulmg" of the bureaucratic process 38 That should come as no surprise While there were many contrlbutmg factors, the bureaucratic pohtlcs practiced by the Army, Navy, and An-Force provide the maJor explanation for the outcome of the report Not surpnsmgly, each service advanced its own orgamzatlonal agenda during the process Without top level leadershlp attuned to and focused on countering these pressures, the result was dqomted Iio study completed m the Pentagon ~11 ever be perfect. but a better understanding of how the services see themselves and practice bureaucratic pohtlcs ma) help future leaders achieve better results
